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Introduction
The interpretation of intellectual property norms has been a fascinating topic especially when cutting
across legal jurisdictions where social, historical and cultural perceptions of ownership vary. The issue
of development presents a kaleidoscopic view of intellectual property rights. It begs the basic question
whether Western justification for intellectual property is still legitimate at the receiving end of the regime.
Classic justification for intellectual property rights is rooted in purely Western values of labour theory,
individual ownership, personality right theory and economic and utilitarian rationales, yet when replicating
this in other civilisationswhere communal values traditionally outweigh private ownership, such justification
appears to be lame and fraught with contradiction.
This contradictory nature of intellectual property rights lies in the presumption that a limited period of
artificial static market competition is instituted for the purpose of promoting greater innovation. This
calculation, however, needs constant weighing and balancing to counteract adverse effects of abusive
market power and stifling creativity. For example, the Médecins Sans Frontières’ (MSF) Access to
Medicines Campaign challenges the legitimacy of drug patent monopolies, new emerging digital
technologies constantly disrupt and reconfigure the boundaries of copyright, and bio-piracy exposes the
unfair nature of intellectual property rules in international development—to name just a few.
One of the prominent features of contemporary intellectual property rights is that the majority are owned
by legal persons or big corporations instead of individual creators.1 This compels us to reconsider the
personality justification for intellectual property and the hypothesis of intellectual property as a “human”
right.
There have been several initiatives reflecting upon the shadow of intellectual property. For example,
the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) expressed the need for a
development-oriented intellectual property regime which aims to promote creativity and technology
transfer.2 Peter Yu considers the role of geography in shaping intellectual property, highlighting the uneven
sub-national development in developing countries.3He further consults the traditional Chinese philosophy
of the Yin-Yang school in order to adapt intellectual property norms to the information economy by
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1 “Top 300 Organizations Granted U.S. Patents in 2015: Are More Patents Better?”, available at http://www.ipo.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06
/2015-Top-300-Patent-Owners.pdf [Accessed November 1, 2016].
2WIPO, “Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP)”, available at http://www.wipo.int/policy/en/cdip/ [Accessed November 1,
2016].
3 Peter K. Yu, “Intellectual Property Geographies” (2014) 6 WIPO J. 1.
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“striking an appropriate non-linear, dynamic balance in a pluralistic order”.4 He is of the view that such
a non-binary Yin-Yang approach would better accommodate multi-stakeholders’ interests in intellectual
property, the complexities of which have been compounded by emerging disruptive technologies.
Granted, intellectual property rights and flexibilities of intellectual property could be deemed as the
two equal forces of yin and yang, which constantly redefine and carve out each other in an organic manner.
One of the key restrictions to patent monopolies is compulsory licensing, which is a decisive instrument
for regulating patents on the grounds of protecting the public interest under certain circumstances. It could
be used to promote development.5 In my other works I consider the role and legal status of compulsory
licensing being not an exception but a conditional right of a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). By treating compulsory licensing as a “right” instead of an “exception”, the burden of proof is
shifted to the complaining party, and the invoking state is deemed right to do so until proven otherwise.6
There needs to be a dynamic balance between rights and flexibilities, and rights and responsibilities, of
intellectual property. The monopolies of intellectual property are expected to discharge the associated
responsibilities of disseminating and diffusing technologies as stated in the principles of the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 (TRIPS Agreement).7 As an
Indian judge expresses in the 2013 compulsory licensing decision:
“[A] right cannot be absolute. Whenever conferred upon a patent holder, the right also carries
accompanying obligations towards the public at large. These rights and obligations, if religiously
enjoyed and discharged, will balance out each other. A slightest imbalance may fetch highly
undesirable results”.8
Nevertheless, the trigger for a compulsory licence has always been under heated debate in developing
countries which have been susceptible to a troubled intellectual property discourse. Intellectual property
rights and flexibilities appear to be two disjointed forces, and big corporations’ strategic intellectual
property entrenchment has resulted in greater inequalities in society. It is thus desirable to harness the two
forces of intellectual property from the viewpoint of development. Against this backdrop, this article will
consider the role of development in intellectual property and, conversely, the role of intellectual property
in development.
Notably, the Nobel Prize winner and economist Joseph Stiglitz, has urged China to foster a
development-oriented intellectual property regime, and to be cautious about blindly adopting an inefficient
intellectual property regime that has proven to be stifling for innovation.9 It is thus desirable to build an
indigenous intellectual property regime taking development into consideration.
I will take China as a case study, examining how in recent years the country has striven to make a
transition from a manufacturing power to an innovation power. Intellectual property is inherently not an
indigenous system in China. Though some form of monopoly could be traced back in history, mainstream
Confucianism views free dissemination of knowledge as a key factor for social progress, and familial and
communal values as outweighing individual rights.10Creativity and innovationwere not viewed as individual
4 Peter K. Yu, “Intellectual Property, Asian Philosophy and the Yin-Yang School” (2015) 7 WIPO J. 1.
5 Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Creating the Institutional Foundations for a Market Economy” in David Kennedy and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds), Law and
Economics with Chinese Characteristics: Institutions for Promoting Development in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), p.266.
6 Phoebe Li, Health Technologies and International Intellectual Property: A Precautionary Approach (Oxon: Routledge, 2014).
7Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 art.8 ; Phoebe Li, “Rights and Responsibilities of Patents: A Precautionary
Patent Regime in WTO Law” (2013) 35 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 216.
8 India Compulsory Licence, Application No.1 of 2011, p.2.
9 Stiglitz, “Creating the Institutional Foundations for a Market Economy” in Kennedy and Stiglitz (eds), Law and Economics with Chinese
Characteristics (2013), p.249.
10Peter K. Yu, “Intellectual Property and Confucianism” in Irene Calboli and Srividhya Ragavan (eds),Diversity in Intellectual Property: Identities,
Interests, and Intersections (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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property. Hence there exist discussions that the underlying reason for low intellectual property protection
and enforcement is due to Confucianism.
In relation to copyright, in a quote from the Analects (Lunyu)—selected sayings of Confucius—the
master mentions that he had only “transmitted what was taught to [him] without making up anything of
[his] own”. He was of the view that new knowledge was made transformative use of pre-existing works.11
Another famous defence is illustrated in William Alford’s book To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense.12
In addition to the Confucian implications for copyright, the Confucian approach also has a profound impact
on patents—specifically on the interpretation of “pubic interests” in the patent regime.
In the following sections, I will introduce the traditional concept of “xiaokang” (moderately prosperous)
to facilitate the smooth transition from corporate elite innovation to mass entrepreneurship and innovation
(crowd or public innovation),13 with a view to building an innovation power and an equitable differentiated
intellectual property regime. I will then discuss the recent Chinese patent law reform for meeting the needs
of such a transition. We next should ask: how do we make a smooth transition from corporate to mass
innovation for intelligent manufacturing? How could such a unique market economy deal with the
ramifications of development and inequalities in intellectual property? How could the slogans and the
government’s agenda realise the vision of a socialist market with Chinese characteristics? What lessons
are to be learned, and could be learned, from the Chinese characteristics in regulation? This article will
examine to what extent Chinese characteristics could contribute to interpreting a sustainable intellectual
property regime, and to relieving the social divide brought about by intellectual property monopolies.
In this article I will argue that in the digital economy it is no longer satisfactory to engage the elite few
in innovation, and that a customised intellectual property regime is essential for the transition to mass
innovation. The next step for consolidating an innovation power is to bridge the gap between the two
spectrums of the market. In transition from elite corporate innovation to mass innovation, a sophisticated
or differentiated intellectual property regime aiming at promoting equality and enhancing the public’s
access to science is necessary. I will examine the interpretations of selected key terms in the development
of contemporary patent law in China. I will further explore what intellectual property is with Chinese
characteristics and, particularly, the implications of “harmonious society”, “xiaokang society” and the
“public interest” in the Chinese context.
This article is divided into four parts. The first section will illustrate why the development agenda is
critical for building intellectual property institutions in developing countries. The second section will
review the rationale for technological regulation in China by looking into the traditional values of
“equilibrium”, “harmony” and “xiaokang society”. The third section will apply the preceding rationale in
contemporary patent law-making, considering the recent amendment to Patent Law of the People’s Republic
of China 1984 (Patent Law) amendment and the pressing need for fostering mass innovation towards
intelligent manufacturing. The final section will conclude by providing signposts for future work.
The new intellectual property power and development
China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy and ranked third in international applications
through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) since 2013.14Yet, the clash between socialism and capitalism
introduced after the opening up of the market in 1978 is demonstrated by growing inequality, disparities
and social divide in many contexts. A high degree of inequality is now a prominent feature in China’s
11 Peter K. Yu, “The Confucian Challenge to Intellectual Property Reforms” (2012) 4 WIPO J. 1.
12William P. Alford, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1995).
13Liu Wei, “Entrepreneurs Get Ahead in Chinese Business”, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/china-watch/business/11621036
/entrepreneurs-get-ahead-in-business.html [Accessed 9 September, 2016]; Emma Boyde, “The Rise of the Asian Entrepreneur”, available at http:/
/www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/41b9ac52-efd5-11e4-ab73-00144feab7de.html [Accessed November 1, 2016].
14WIPO, Patent Cooperation Treaty Yearly Review: The International Patent System (Geneva, 2014).
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market economy, and is demonstrated by income inequality,15 education inequality, innovation inequality,16
and regional inequality17 where rural-urban and inland-coastal divides are widening.18 The country is now
comprised of developed, developing and under-developed regions. Even with the government’s “go west”
strategy in 2000, which aimed to bridge the gaps across regions, disparities are still prominent.19 It is
surprising to learn that income and regional disparities are now greater in China than those in the United
States,20 and that income inequality has led to one per cent of the Chinese population possessing one-third
of the country’s wealth.21
The current challenge in China is not under-development but rather fair, equitable, justifiable and
all-round balanced development. China’s former leader, Deng Xiaoping, once revealed that “we permit
some people and some regions to become prosperous first, for the purpose of achieving common prosperity
faster”.22 Following on from Deng Xiaoping’s strategic view that some people should be allowed to get
rich before others, how could the intermediate goal of “getting a handful rich” be transformed into the
promise of a “well-off, prosperous (xiaokang) society” enjoyed by all?
Recently, the Chinese Government announced the 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social
Development (2016–2020) (135 Plan) whichmandates the building of amanufacturing power by integrating
intelligent manufacturing.23 It is stressed that promoting shared development is necessary for developing
a “xiaokang” society in all respects, which is the end target for mass and crowd innovation. It is proposed
that development should be people-centred—that is, development is for the people, development is reliant
on the people, and the people should share the results of development.24 Sharing is the essence of socialism
with Chinese characteristics, and thus five goals are put forward: innovative development, harmonious
development, green development, open development and shared development. In so doing, an equitable
intellectual property regime is key to innovation in the market economy.
In this article I will argue that the way to combating inequality in intellectual property institutions is
by means of enhancingmass entrepreneurship and innovation, and that the transition from elite innovation
to mass entrepreneurship and innovation is ultimately dependent upon the huge task of reducing disparities
in access to infrastructure and access to knowledge. The following section will reflect on the unique
Chinese approach to technological regulation set in the historical, philosophical and socio-political context.
Approaches to regulation of technologies with Chinese characteristics
According toHistorical Records (Shiji) there were six dominant schools in Chinese philosophy: Yin-Yang,
Confucianism (Rujia), Mohism (Mojia), School of Names, Dialecticians or Logicians (Mingjia), Legalism
(Fajia) and Daoism. Yet in traditional Chinese society, the three mainstream philosophies are Buddhism,
Confucianism and Daoism, collectively named as Sanjiao (three schools).25 In modern society, we can
15 “Gini out of the Bottle”, The Economist, January 26, 2013.
16Fan Peilei andWanGuanghua, “China’s Regional Inequality in Innovation Capability: 1995–2004” inWanGuanghua (ed.), Inequality and Growth
in Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.144.
17Xie Yu and Zhou Xiang, “Income Inequality in Today’s China” (2014) 111 Proc. Nat’l Academy Sci. 6928, available at http://www.pnas.org
/content/111/19/6928.full.pdf [Accessed November 1, 2016].
18Liu Xielin and Liu Fianbing, “Science and Technology and Innovation Policy in China” in Jose Eduardo Cassiolato and Virginia Vitorino (eds),
BRICS and Development Alternatives: Innovation Systems and Politics (London: Anthem Press, 2011), p.154.
19Liu and Liu, “Science and Technology and Innovation Policy in China” in Cassiolato and Vitorino (eds), BRICS and Development Alternatives
(2011), p.157.
20Xie and Zhou, “Income Inequality in Today’s China” (2014) 111 Proc. Nat’l Academy Sci. 6928.
21 Institute of Social Science Survey, Peking University, 2014.
22Xie and Zhou, “Income Inequality in Today’s China” (2014) 111 Proc. Nat’l Academy Sci. 6928; “Gini out of the Bottle”, The Economist, January
26, 2013.
23 “The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China”, available at http://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail
_forward_1445312?from=groupmessage&isappinstalled=0 [Accessed November 1, 2016].
24 “The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China”, Ch.4, available at http://m.thepaper.cn
/newsDetail_forward_1445312?from=groupmessage&isappinstalled=0 [Accessed November 1, 2016].
25Yu, “Intellectual Property and Confucianism” in Calboli and Ragavan (eds), Diversity in Intellectual Property (2015).
164 The WIPO Journal
(2016) W.I.P.O.J., Issue 2 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
see the convergence of Buddhism and Daoism in people’s religious life, whilst Confucianism remains the
foundation of social and intellectual values.
Daoism was founded by Lao Zi in the sixth century BC. Lao Zi saw Dao (the way of heaven) as a
natural law. His main teaching was that of “wu wei” which means “non-action” or “not acting”. One typical
saying is that “we shape clay into a pot, but it is the emptiness inside that holds whatever we want”. It
could be interpreted that Daoism holds a laissez-faire approach to regulation and expects that Dao will
automatically redress abnormalities in due course.
Confucianism was founded by Master Kong (Kong Zi) in 551–479 BC. Compared to Daoism,
Confucianism holds a humanistic view to life and establishes Confucius’ ideal of social control through
moral education (that is, a rule of Li without laws). It could be interpreted that the Confucian approach
to regulation would depend on evaluating whether technologies could relieve pain and how actions should
be adopted to avoid abuse of human worth and dignity.26
It is also noteworthy that Legalism played a deciding role in the Qin Dynasty when China experienced
its first technological feat in its innovation of military technologies. The first Emperor of Qin (Qin Se
Huangdi, 246 BC) relied on Legalism established by Han Feizi (280–283 BC), who was of the view that
man is born evil and thus the state can only rule by rigid command and by severe punishment and reward.
As such, fa (law), shu (method) and shi (legitimacy) are the means of achieving this rigid command. Under
the Legalism regime, China celebrated another technological feat in building its world-famous terracotta
armies and their lethal weapons with strict control and organisation of artisans and workmanship.27
Chinese approaches to technological regulation are still deeply rooted in the combined rationale of
Daoism (laissez faire), Confucianism (humanistic) and Legalism (rigid control). Considering the balance
of the Yin-Yang forces, the optimal approach would be a balance of these three schools, acting in accordance
with specific features of the technologies at issue and their unique societal implications. Chinese approaches
appear to be dominated by more government intervention in steering, guiding, planning and co-ordination,
compared with theWestern liberal approach to the market and to regulation. The volume, pace, frequency,
intensity and efficiency of the Chinese Government’s policy-making in relation to fostering technological
development and industry upgrade is very impressive.
Science and technology (S&T) and innovation are the main enablers for building a prosperous society
set out in theChinese National Plan 2006–2020. The government has thus set forth the “Special Industrial
Policy” in order to foster strategic industries. Key innovative companies were given direct support by the
mandates of the National Programme 2006–2020 for the development of science and technology in the
medium and long term.28 There are agendas for decentralised innovation policy which gives regional
government more autonomy in strategic innovation, albeit that evidence shows this further widens the
regional gap.29
Alongside the philosophical underpinning, China is unique in her adoption of a wide range of slogans
that accompany social and legal transformation. Although these slogans seem resolute, concise, succinct
and punchy, they nevertheless often appear vague and puzzling toWestern readers. It is, therefore, essential
to understand the historical and cultural context of the ideologies behind them. In the following paragraphs,
I will introduce selected key phrases the government used in the context of development.
For example, “harmonious society” has been a key target for economic development and emphasises
“balance” with the following parameters: limited disparities between urban and rural areas, between the
26 Fan Ruiping, Reconstructionist Confucianism: Rethinking Morality after the West (New York: Springer, 2010).
27Marco Martinon-Torres, Li Xiuzhen Janice, Andrew Bevan, Xia Yin, Zhao Kun and Thilo Rehren, “Forty Thousand Arms for a Single Emperor:
From Chemical Data to the Labor Organization behind the Bronze Arrows of the Terracotta Army” (2014) 21 J. Archaeological Method & Theory
534.
28Liu and Liu, “Science and Technology and Innovation Policy in China” in Cassiolato and Vitorino (eds), BRICS and Development Alternatives
(2011), pp.133–134.
29Liu and Liu, “Science and Technology and Innovation Policy in China” in Cassiolato and Vitorino (eds), BRICS and Development Alternatives
(2011), p.148.
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advanced and less advanced regions, between the rich and poor as well as a balance between government
and society and balance across all sectors of the economy.30 Such balance is anticipated to minimise the
socio-economic disparities in development which can be traced back to the book of Zhongyong (Doctrine
of the Mean), where the state of “equilibrium” is dubbed as the key to the state of “harmony”:
“While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the
state of equilibrium. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there
ensues what may be called the state of harmony. This equilibrium is the great root from which grow
all the human actings in the world, and this harmony is the universal path which they all should
pursue”.31
Based upon this rationale, everything needs to be done in moderation. An extreme, drastic approach
has rarely been deemed appropriate or sustainable in the history of China. Everything needs to be acted
in proportion to their due degree.
As mentioned above, the present Chinese Government, as a goal for development, has picked up the
concept of “xiaokang” in the recent 135 Plan.32 A “xiaokang” society refers to a well-off, moderately
prosperous society in which people lead a fairly comfortable life. The term “xiaokang” originates from
two sources: the first, from Shi Ji (Book of History), implies an ideal living standard of ordinary people
which refers to a medium living standard between “keeping warm and full (wenbao)” and “rich (fuyu)”;33
the second, from Li Ji (The Book of Rites) (551–479 BC), was identified by intellectuals as a secondary
ideal society being compared to Utopia, namely “tatong”.34Tatong is the ultimate ideal utopia shared by
the public in which people enjoy social civilisation, stable order and security, yet without social class and
exploitation. Xiaokang is a level lower than tatong, in which private ownership and social class exist but
are harnessed by “li” (rites) to maintain social order and social life.
Tatong is the perfect world of equality, fraternity, harmony, welfare and justice that is described as
“tianxia as the public”:
“When the Grand course was pursued, a public and common spirit ruled all under the sky; they chose
men of talents, virtue, and ability; their words were sincere, and what they cultivated was harmony.
Thus men did not love their parents only, nor treat as children only their own sons. A competent
provision was secured for the aged till their death, employment for the able-bodied, and the means
of growing up to the young. They showed kindness and compassion to widows, orphans, childless
men, and those who were disabled by disease, so that they were all sufficiently maintained. Males
had their proper work, and females had their homes. (They accumulated) articles (of value), disliking
that they should be thrown away upon the ground, but not wishing to keep them for their own
gratification. (They laboured) with their strength, disliking that it should not be exerted, but not
exerting it (only) with a view to their own advantage. In this way (selfish) schemings were repressed
and found no development”.35
While xiaokang is depicted as “tianxia as family”:
“Now that the Grand course has fallen into disuse and obscurity, the kingdom is a family inheritance.
Everyone loves (above all others) his own parents and cherishes (only) his own sons. People
30 Stiglitz, “Creating the Institutional Foundations for a Market Economy” in Kennedy and Stiglitz (eds), Law and Economics with Chinese
Characteristics (2013), p.75.
31 Zhongyong, available at “The Internet Classics Archive”, http://classics.mit.edu/Confucius/doctmean.html [Accessed October 28, 2016].
32 “The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China”, available at http://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail
_forward_1445312?from=groupmessage&isappinstalled=0 [Accessed November 1, 2016].
33 Shi Ji (“Greater Odes of the Kingdom”), available at “Chinese Classics & Translations”, http://wengu.tartarie.com/wg/wengu.php?l=Shijing&m
=NOzh&no=253 [Accessed October 28, 2016] (“The people indeed are heavily burdened, but perhaps a little ease may be good for them.”).
34 Li Ji Bk.VII.
35 “Chinese Text Project”, trans. James Legge, available at http://ctext.org/liji/li-yun [Accessed October 28, 2016].
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accumulate articles and exert their strength for their own advantage. Great men imagine it is the rule
that their states should descend in their own families. Their object is to make the walls of their cities
and suburbs strong and their ditches and moats secure. The rules of propriety and of what is right are
regarded as the threads by which they seek to maintain in its correctness the relation between ruler
and minister; in its generous regard that between father and son; in its harmony that between elder
brother and younger; and in a community of sentiment that between husband and wife; and in
accordance with them they frame buildings and measures; lay out the fields and hamlets (for the
dwellings of the husbandmen); adjudge the superiority to men of valour and knowledge; and regulate
their achievements with a view to their own advantage”.36
In a “tatong” society individuals will see others as their own family without differentiation, yet in a
“xiaokang” society they will treat others in accordance with the approximation to the self which reflects
that the love for self and family overrides the love for society. Confucian philosophers at that time saw
the main difference between tatong and xiaokang as the lowering of social morality. Yet the ideal “tatong”
society reflected a nostalgic and reminiscent description of humanity’s original society in ancient epochs.
Establishing a “xiaokang” society was an intermediate means of restoring the selfless world of Utopia in
the long run. In other words, xiaokang is a realistic, practical and achievable stepping stone to the ultimate
Utopia of tatong.
The “xiaokang” value sensibly recognises the frailty of mankind to differentiate self and family from
the society, from which individual ownership of property emerges to form the backdrop of society.
Considering both interpretations, it should be borne in mind that “xiaokang” is an intermediate means for
achieving the ultimate “tatong” world where the “public and common spirit” under the sky belittles
individual advantage and ownership. The corollary of the “xiaokang” patent regime could then be described
as patents granted to mass entrepreneurs in order to build a moderately prosperous society in which people
lead a fairly comfortable life, and yet various forms of public interests should be embedded in the intellectual
property regime to strike a balance between public and private interests. In some circumstances, private
interests should be restrained for the protection of the greater good. This view resonates with the
presumption that intellectual property rights are granted as an intermediate means for the ultimate goal of
promoting innovation in society. Intellectual property is a tool instituted for promoting the public interest
and the public’s access to the benefits arising from scientific research. Following on from the discussion
on the “xiaokang” characteristic of patents, the next section will elaborate further on the patent regime
with Chinese characteristics.
Patent power with Chinese characteristics
Contemporary Chinese patent law-making is a product of external pressure and internal push.37 Peter Yu
describes the establishment of the modern Chinese Patent Law as “building the ladder” of development,
which is comprised of five stages: creation; imitation and transplantation; standardisation and customisation;
indigenisation; and “what next”.38
The “creation” stage was triggered in the late 1970s after China re-opened the market to the world in
1978, followed by its accession to the WIPO. The first Patent Law was enacted in 1984, followed by the
first revision in 1992. Before the accession to the WTO, the Patent Law was again amended in 2000, with
a focus on standardisation and customisation with a view to providing sufficient intellectual property
protection compliant with the TRIPSAgreement . In 2008, the State Council introduced the third amendment
to the Patent Law and the National Intellectual Property Strategy Action Plan (2014–2020) to provide a
36 “Chinese Text Project”, trans. James Legge, available at http://ctext.org/liji/li-yun [Accessed October 28, 2016].
37 Peter K. Yu, “Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle” in Daniel J. Gervais (ed.), Intellectual Property, Trade and
Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS Plus Era, 1st edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.173.
38 Peter K. Yu, “Building the Ladder: Three Decades of Development of the Chinese Patent System” (2013) 5 WIPO J. 1.
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comprehensive plan for protecting intellectual property and to highlight the need for an independent (or
self-control, self-master) intellectual property system (zizhu zhishi chanquan, independent intellectual
property),39 in which an indigenous innovation (zizhu chuangxin) policy is set forth.
The first two revisions of the Patent Law were outward-looking, focusing on building intellectual
property capacity to attract foreign investment and meeting international requirements from the PCT and
the WTO TRIPS Agreement . Yet from the third revision onwards, there has been a shift towards meeting
internal needs—developing the patent system in the Chinese context in accordance with its own economic,
technological and cultural interests.40 Considering the need for indigenisation, the third revision of the
Patent Law thus introduced the absolute novelty standard,41 provisions concerning the protection of genetic
resources,42 the strengthening of compulsory licensing,43 parallel importation and the Chinese equivalent
of Bolar exemption.44 The third revision of the Patent Law was then concluded in 2010.
Following on from the recent government’s agenda on building an innovation power for the transition
to intelligent manufacturing, I name the above “what next” stage the “mass innovation” stage, whereby
the development agenda for a “xiaokang” society is a critical theme in striking a balance in intellectual
property monopolies. The primary goal for this nascent phase is therefore not to blindly transplant foreign
intellectual property infrastructure but to conscientiously build a development-oriented intellectual property
institution that reflects local characteristics.45 A “mass innovation” patent regime should be able to redress
the disparities and to balance the interests of big corporations with those of mass entrepreneurs. It should
differentiate certain fields of technologies for the purpose of safeguarding the public interest and not be
compromised by private patent monopolies. Joseph Stiglitz elaborates on the idea that a
development-oriented intellectual property regime requires special consideration to ensure effective
competition, access to lifesaving medicines, the transfer of technology, and protection of traditional
knowledge and genetic resources.46
Following the self-reliance innovation agenda, Chinese scholars have explored an intellectual property
system with Chinese characteristics by proposing the “inspired self-reliance innovation theory”, “state
strategic theory”, “interests balance theory”, “institution protection theory” and the “cultural pass-on
theory”.47 It is argued that a mature intellectual property system needs to be based in the Chinese context,
to solve Chinese problems, to form Chinese languages, to have Chinese expressions, to voice Chinese
viewpoints and to follow a Chinese path in order to form a Chinese model by amending the current
Western-centric international legislative trend.48 A socialist intellectual property system focuses on
humanism, all-round equilibrium, and sustainable and harmonious development and insists that a localised
intellectual property system would consist of socialist values including “fairness and justice”, “honesty
and trustworthiness” and “harmony and fine-management”.49
In the search of a sustainable Chinese intellectual property system, it is highlighted that the main problem
of economic and social development lies in imbalance or inequality rather than under-development. It is
self-evident that the geographical disparities between urban and rural areas, east and west, and amongst
39State Intellectual Property Office,National Patent Development Strategy (2011–2020) (2010), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages
/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf [Accessed November 1, 2016].
40 Stefan Luginbuehl, “China’s Patent Policy” in Stefan Luginbuehl and Peter Ganea, Patent Law in Greater China (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
2014).
41Chinese Patent Law 2008 art.22(5).
42Chinese Patent Law 2008 arts 5 and 16(5).
43 State Intellectual Property Office, National Patent Development Strategy (2011–2020) (2010), para.20; Chinese Patent Law 2008 arts 48–58.
44Chinese Patent Law 2008 art.69.
45 Stiglitz, “Creating the Institutional Foundations for a Market Economy” in Kennedy and Stiglitz (eds), Law and Economics with Chinese
Characteristics (2013).
46 Stiglitz, “Creating the Institutional Foundations for a Market Economy” in Kennedy and Stiglitz (eds), Law and Economics with Chinese
Characteristics (2013), pp.266–267.
47Wu Han-Dong, “Institutionalisation of Intellectual Property Theories and Chinese Localisation Research” (2014) 6 L. & Soc. Dev.
48Wu, “Institutionalisation of Intellectual Property Theories and Chinese Localisation Research” (2014) 6 L. & Soc. Dev.
49Wu, “Institutionalisation of Intellectual Property Theories and Chinese Localisation Research” (2014) 6 L. & Soc. Dev.
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fields of industry suggest that intellectual property trajectories will not follow a one-size-fits-all but a
differentiated path in relation to fields of technology and location.
The scope of the granted patent right has a direct impact on free dissemination of knowledge in society.
The relevant limitations to patentability set out in the Chinese Patent Law include: “inventions-creations”
violating the law or social morality, or harming the public interest;50 those being deemed as scientific
discoveries; rules and methods for intellectual activities; methods for the diagnosis or treatment of diseases;
and animal or plant varieties.51 Patents may be granted for production methods of animal or plant varieties.52
Social morality refers to ethical and moral norms generally recognised and accepted by the public,
which is a fluid concept dependent on the cultural and geographical background.53 Inventions-creations
detrimental to the public interest means the use of an invention that may cause detriment to the public or
may disrupt the normal order of society, examples of which may be inventions that seriously pollute the
environment, seriously waste energy or resources, disrupt the ecological balance or impair public health.54
Interestingly, subjective limitations are set out in the Patent Examination Guidelines indicating that patents
would not be granted for applications concerning
“an important political event of the State or a religious belief, hurting the sentiments of the people
or of an ethnic group, or advocating superstition”.55
Again, the interpretation of such an iteration could be extremely broad. It suggests that the social element
of the public’s perception to patent monopolies could play a major part in patent granting.
Currently, the fourth amendment to the Chinese Patent Law has been underway since 2014 following
a range of goals the State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO) set out in the National Patent
Development Strategy (2011–2020). Major policy measures determined by the strategy include revising
and improving the Patent Law, increasing zizhu chuangxi (indigenous innovation) and improving the
enforcement of patent rights.
Zizhu chuangxi means innovation activities that are able to select new innovative goals independently,
to dominate the innovation process and to own and utilise innovative outcomes.56 In a market economy,
an innovative state with Chinese characteristics refers to strong innovative capacity, high innovative
efficiency, excellent innovative environment and abundant innovative talents.57 It is believed that in order
to improve the efficiency of resource allocation, the government’s leadership would need to combine
organically with the functions of the market.58 It is stressed that the role of the government to co-ordinate
resources for technological innovation is particularly vital for spurring market vitality and social creativity.
Key industries that require the central government’s involvement are those connected to the state’s strategic
technologies and public interest-related technologies (minsheng technologies that are closely connected
to the population’s livelihood and fundamental frontier technologies).59
Evidently, the fourth amendment to the Patent Law aims to build an intellectual property power with
Chinese characteristics and socialism. The main agenda includes broadening patent protection, promoting
the implementation and utilisation of patents, implementing government services, perfecting patent
50Chinese Patent Law 2008 art.5.
51Chinese Patent Law 2008 art.25.
52Chinese Patent Law 2008 art.25.
53 State Intellectual Property Office, Patent Examination Guidelines (2010), Pt II, Ch.1, art.3.1.2.
54State Intellectual Property Office, Patent Examination Guidelines (2010), Pt II, Ch.1, art.3.1.2. Examples of inventions contrary to social morality
or detrimental to the public interest include: a process for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; a process for cloning human
beings or a cloned human being; use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; a process for modifying the genetic identity of animals
likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefits to human beings or animals.
55 State Intellectual Property Office, Patent Examination Guidelines (2010), Pt II, Ch.1, art.3.1.2.
56Chinese Academy of Sciences, Technological Revolution and Modernisation of China—Innovation 2050: Science and Technology and the Future
of China (Beijing: Science Press, 2009), p.116.
57Chinese Academy of Sciences, Technological Revolution and Modernisation of China (2009), p.116.
58Chinese Academy of Sciences, Technological Revolution and Modernisation of China (2009), p.129.
59Chinese Academy of Sciences, Technological Revolution and Modernisation of China (2009), p.129.
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examination for quality patents and perfecting patent agency systems.60 In order to facilitate the
implementation of new technologies, the new proposed Patent Law incorporates an implied licensing
mechanism for standard essential patents. A patent holder should not grant an exclusive licence or file for
an injunction during the period of licensing rights.61
It is noteworthy that, whilst enlarging the scope of patent protection is a key objective, it sets out a
separate principle clause with a view to regulating the abusive use of patents as well as balancing private
and public interests, reflecting the objectives and purpose clauses of the TRIPS Agreement . The proposed
art.14 on the purpose of patents reads:
“The implementation of patent rights shall abide by the good faith principles, shall not harm the
public interest, shall not improperly exclude or restrict competition, shall not impede the advancement
of technology”.
The interpretation of “good faith” and the “public interest” is again vague and broad.
In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on constructing an intellectual property power
and an innovative country for a “xiaokang” society in the Action Plan for Carrying out the National
Intellectual Property Strategy (2014–2020).62 A corollary to the “xiaokang” approach in the intellectual
property regime is the suggestion that intellectual property is never absolute, but should be weighed against
other diverse interests for achieving equilibrium and harmony.63 This is where the Yin-Yang school comes
into play. Alongside the Yin-Yang school, the “xiaokang” spirit demonstrates the intermediate and
self-restraining characteristic of patents, which will serve well to balance the diverse stakeholders’ interests,
particularly the transition from elite corporate innovation towards mass entrepreneurship and innovation,
as required by the government’s intelligent manufacturing agenda. In an economy aiming to foster mass
entrepreneurship and innovation, consideration should be taken in striking a balance between the tension
arising from the clash of interests of big corporations and those of individual entrepreneurs.
The next section delineates a differentiated intellectual property regime customised for socially valued
inventions that are closely related to people’s livelihood.
A differentiated approach to intellectual property for socially valued inventions
Technologies that result in significant social impacts and that are fundamental to addressing societal values
are what I call “socially valued inventions” (SVI), or the Chinese call “minsheng (people’s livelihood)
technologies”. They have a direct impact on societal needs in terms of human rights and equality which,
in my view, merit a distinct “public goods” approach to incentivising innovation.64 Subjecting SVI to free
market competition without government planning and co-ordination would likely result in market failure,
as seen in the access to medicines and orphan drugs scenarios.
There are increasing concerns over the monopolistic power on key innovation in a free market. The
view that creativity and innovation are not individual property but “public goods” is also expressed in the
debate amongst leading economists on the ramifications of privatising knowledge about key technologies
which are to serve societal interests. For example, Keith Maskus considers intellectual property rights in
response to the governance of technologies that are vital in serving the public interest in health, climate
60China IPR, “Translation of the Draft Patent Law Amendment” and SIPO’s Explanations about the Draft Amendment to the Patent Law, available
at https://chinaipr.com/2015/12/17/translation-of-draft-patent-law-amendment/ [Accessed November 1, 2016].
61Draft Fourth Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law art.83.
62 State Council of China, Action Plan for Carrying out the National Intellectual Property Strategy (2014–2020) (2014), para.64; State Intellectual
Property Office,National Intellectual Property Strategy Action Plan (2014–2020) (2014); Office of the Inter-Ministerial JointMeeting for Implementation
of the National Intellectual Property Strategy, Promotion Plan for the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy 2015 (2015).
63 Shi Ji (“Greater Odes of the Kingdom”).
64 Phoebe Li, “3D Bioprinting Technologies: Patents, Innovation and Access” (2014) 6 L. Innovation & Tech. 282.
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change, genetic resources and traditional knowledge.65 He proposes a “comprehensive approach” to
innovation which incorporates broader elements of intellectual property,66 with a view to minimising the
negative effects of patents on society. Such a comprehensive approach is proposed for
“regulating the use of [intellectual property rights] that help bring these poorer regions and groups
more fully into the modern commercial system”.67
Furthermore, Joseph Stiglitz proposed a similar “portfolio approach” to assessing China’s innovation
strategy.68 Both share the view that strong intellectual property rights alone are insufficient for further
technological development. Wider drivers for innovation, such as government funding, prize systems,
competition, trade secrets and human capital, are playing a vital role in efficient innovation.
The differentiated approach to intellectual property is demonstrated in different industries and
technological sectors in China. While patents play an important role in digital communication,69 they are
not a critical element for the software industry, and the Chinese Patent Law provides a relatively narrower
scope of protection for biotech and pharmaceutical patents,70 partly due to a successful agricultural
biotechnology industry that is mainly in the public sector.
Efforts to build a differentiated intellectual property regime are overarching and diverse. For example,
the Chinese Government aims to strengthen intellectual property in key technologies and sets out the
mechanism of “preferential examination of invention patent applications” for strategic emerging industries
such as energy saving and environmental protection, the new-generation information technology, biology,
high-end equipmentmanufacturing, new energy, newmaterials and green technologies.71 Stronger protection
for innovative pharmaceutical technologies, new varieties of plants and geographical indications for
farming produce (Golden farming engineering)72 have also been noted. Key fields in relation to living
security (minsheng or people’s livelihood) and high-tech industry given intellectual property enforcement
include food, pharmaceuticals, medical apparatus and environmental protection. As to the innovation of
a universal health system, the Chinese Academy of Sciences sets out the goals of shifting the current
medical model from disease therapy to diagnostic prevention and intervention and combining contemporary
life sciences and traditional medicine.73
Another example of realisingmass entrepreneurship and innovation is through fostering digital intelligent
manufacturing in 3D printing. The Chinese Government is now keen to facilitate mass entrepreneurship
and innovation by means of promoting the development of makerspaces in specific pilot sectors such as
information, biotech, modern agriculture, high-end device manufacture, new energy, newmaterials, energy
efficiency and modern service industry.74 Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may benefit from
certain government policy in fostering new start-up businesses, yet still find it difficult to compete against
big corporations in securing funding. SMEs are also less resourceful in managing a healthy intellectual
65Keith, E. Maskus, Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global Economics of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century (Washington: Peterson
Institute for International Economics, 2012), pp.233–312.
66Keith E. Maskus, “Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO Accession Package: Assessing China’s Reforms” in Deepak Bhattasali, Li Shantong
and Will Martin (eds), China and the WTO: Assessing, Policy Reform, and Poverty Reduction Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),
p.66.
67Maskus, “Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO Accession Package” in Bhattasali, Li and Martin (eds), China and the WTO: Assessing, Policy
Reform, and Poverty Reduction Strategies (2004), p.66.
68 Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Institutional Design for China’s Innovation System: Implications for Intellectual Property Rights” in Kennedy and Stiglitz
(eds), Law and Economics with Chinese Characteristics (2013).
69WIPO, Patent Cooperation Treaty Yearly Review (2014).
70Li Yahong, “Intellectual Property and Innovation: A Case Study of High-tech Industries in China” (2010) 13 Or. Rev. Int’l L. 263.
71Office of the Inter-Ministerial JointMeeting for Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy,Promotion Plan for the Implementation
of the National Intellectual Property Strategy 2013 (2013).
72Office of the Inter-Ministerial JointMeeting for Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy,Promotion Plan for the Implementation
of the National Intellectual Property Strategy 2013 (2013).
73Chinese Academy of Sciences, Technological Revolution and Modernisation of China (2009), p.42.
74Council of the People’s Republic of China, “State Council Encourages Development of Makerspaces”, available at http://english.gov.cn/policies
/latest_releases/2016/02/18/content_281475292128478.htm [Accessed November 1, 2016].
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property portfolio due to insufficient awareness or capacity to do so. Intellectual property is generally not
recognised as an effective company asset. Some feel uneasy about applying patent monopolies on the
“knowledge taught by teachers”; others may use patent applications solely as a means of securing
government funding.75 In order to build the intellectual property infrastructure for crowd and mass
innovation, strategic considerations for fostering mass innovation should be given priority over corporate
innovation. For example, customising the patent regime for SMEs in relation to patent application, licensing
platforms and mechanisms for maintaining rights.
Following the Yin-Yang school and the “xiaokang” objectives, an optimal patent regime inherently
carries a self-restraining force, expected to be complemented by other innovation initiatives. The current
patent regime appears to be archaic for emerging technologies. One prominent example is the multi-faceted
challenge posed by grassroots open innovation in 3D printing, whereby consumers are becoming
“prosumers” by engaging in product development and content generation.
One of the prominent features of 3D printing is decentralisation of the production chain. Localisation,
or re-distributed manufacturing in 3D printing, creates opportunities for grassroots local production and
potentially offers the solution to reducing disparities in development. Yet, 3D printing not only disrupts
the legal norms of intellectual property, but also the broader legal context such as risk regulation and
safety, product liability, consumer protection and insurance policy. The disruptive nature of emerging
technologies requires a holistic and interdisciplinary approach to customising the intellectual property
regime. It is thus insufficient to consider patents within the traditional domain of the intellectual property
castle.
There are four steps of development in indigenous innovation: imitation and reverse engineering;
re-innovation (improved invention); collective innovation (combined invention); and original innovation.
Only those inventions that reach the original innovation level can be granted patent monopoly. Yet
inventions developed from mass entrepreneurship and innovation are mostly incremental, and typically
lower than the standard “novelty” requirement. The rise of aesthetic functional objects also blurs the
traditional dichotomy between patents and copyright. The quick turn-around rate of consumer products
does not fit neatly into the lengthy patent term. Furthermore, in response to the above challenges posed
to patents, alternative proposals for a differentiated patent regime should be considered by accommodating
micro-patents,76 partial patents,77 quasi-patents and semi-patents, weakening patents78 that are tailored for
mass innovation in the digital economy.
Future Patent Law amendment: A “xiaokang” patent regime for mass innovation
In an intelligent manufacturing era, an intellectual property power is defined by the ability to foster mass
entrepreneurship and innovation as opposed to the entrenchedmonopolies granted to corporate innovation.
The patent system will need to reflect the need for public access to scientific innovation which strikes an
optimal balance between public and private interests. Following the rationale of equilibrium and harmony,
intellectual property rights are not absolute and should be self-restraining specifically in matters relating
to socially valued innovation. Patents are an intermediate means of achieving prosperity for all in society.
I have introduced the “xiaokang” characteristic of the patent system tailored for mass entrepreneurship
and innovation. It is proposed in this article that a patent power is the ability to empower the mass public
and not only the elite few, and that a “xiaokang” approach to intellectual property is fit for purpose and
for redressing the widening inequality in society.
75 Findings from my interviews with Chinese 3D printing industry in 2016.
76Hod Lipson and Melba Kurman, Fabricated: The New World of 3D Printing, (Indianapolis: Wiley, 2013), pp.237–238.
77Gideon Parchomovsky and Michael Mattioli, “Partial Patents” (2011) 111 Colum. L. Rev. 207.
78Lucas Osborn, Joshua M. Pearce and Amberlee Haselhuhn, “The Case for Weaker Patents”, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2585764
[Accessed November 1, 2016].
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